I don't pretend to know anything about Philosophy of Language. That's why I'm not very embarrassed to ask this question:
What's up in "Sense and Reference", when Frege says "By the truth value of a sentence I understand the circumstance that it is true or false." And then there's this quote, when he says, "Judgments can be regarded as advances from a thought to a truth value . . . one might also say that judgments are distinctions of parts within truth values".
I'm sure I'm missing something totally basic, so can someone tell me? I'm trying to figure out what Frege thought "the true" is. Something like a truthmaker (which I start thinking about when circumstances for truth are mentioned) is off limits, 'cause either there are bunches and bunches of truth values in virtue of the bunches and bunches of truthmakers, or the true is the fusion of all of them, in which case (I've been told) we'd need something too correspondence-ish for Frege (even though the fusion of all truthmakers would give us a start to making lovely sense of the judgments qua distinctions of parts of truth values stuff).
Help would be greatly appreciated.
And happy valentine's day!